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ABSTRACT
As the nation confronts multiple federal and state attacks on employee
noncompetition agreements (“NCAs”), one issue has remained relatively
obscure: may an employer that terminates a worker for reasons not related
to performance nevertheless enforce an NCA? A scattering of cases mostly
holds no, and the recent Restatement of Employment Law’s agreement
*
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Rachel Arnow-Richman for sharing some thoughts on this topic. As always, she is
insightful, and my ideas more or less align with her thinking on the core issue addressed.
In contrast, Steve Willborn was not persuaded by my argument, but he did make several
helpful suggestions. And my thanks to colleagues Tim Glynn, who alerted me to gaps in
my thinking and Ed Hartnett, who posed some critical questions (critical in both senses of
the word!). Thanks also to Professor T. Leigh Anenson for a helpful conversation on
equity. Finally, my gratitude to Esad Metjahic, Seton Hall class of 2021, for excellent
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with those decisions is likely to be very influential for the great majority
of jurisdictions that have not yet addressed the question but may be forced
to in light of massive COVID-related layoffs.
This Article supports the Restatement’s proposed rule, while exploring
the fascinating doctrinal and policy issues implicated in the question.
Ultimately, it sees the rule as rooted in concerns about fairness to employees
that are typically given short shrift in current doctrine. This is true even
for a Restatement that otherwise seems decided to opt for an economic
approach that would validate NCAs that are “reasonably tailored” to defined
legitimate employer interests.
Adoption of a rule denying enforcement in such situations also poses
some interesting second-order questions, such as how to determine when
a termination is performance-related and probable employer responses to
a new dispensation. All are explored in the pages that follow.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the little-noticed contributions of the American Law Institute’s
recent Restatement of Employment Law 1 was its prescription that
postemployment noncompetition agreements (“NCAs”) 2 should be
unenforceable when the employee has been terminated without cause.
Although case authority leans in this direction,3 it can scarcely be described
as robust, and the Restatement’s endorsement of the principle may prove
critical in convincing the courts to generally adopt it. Judicial acceptance

1.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. (AM. L. INST. 2015). For reasons peculiar to the
American Law Institute (ALI), earlier drafts are sometimes referred to as the “Third”
Restatement, although this was the Institute’s first attempt to restate the law relating to
employment and the final version omits the word “Third.”
2. “Noncompetition” clauses or postemployment restraints of trade are sometimes
distinguished from theoretically lesser restraints such as nonsolicitation clauses, which
may be aimed at customers and co-workers. See Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds:
How Employers Fix the Talent Market, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 678 (2020) (describing
a variety of vertical restraints imposed by employers on their workers). For present
purposes, no distinction will be drawn among the varying provisions unless otherwise
noted since the functional reach of any given restraint depends on the context.
3. See infra Section III.
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of such a rule could scarcely be timelier in view of the large-scale layoffs
of employees4 that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic.5
The Restatement has been frequently criticized as being largely retrograde,
both overall6 and specifically with respect to its treatment of employee
NCAs.7 Indeed, those sections are broadly consistent with the rules laid
down more than three decades previously in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.8 And that despite indications that the law is already moving on
in this area.9 The Restatement was finally approved only in 2015, at which
point there was already increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional
4. Although the term “employee” is a frequently contested label in applying
regulatory regimes, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law,
55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 443–50 (2020), the common law cases dealing with
covenants in restraint of trade seem unconcerned with the “control” or alternative tests that
dominate questions of statutory application. Indeed, a less noticed branch of the governing
doctrine concerns restraints entered into in connection with the sale of a business, see, e.g.,
Mitchel v. Reynolds [1711] 24 QB 347 at 347–48 (Eng.), although there are distinctive issues
in that context. In any event, the discussion that follows may well apply to “independent
contractors” as well as employees. See Ag Spectrum Co. v. Elder, 865 F.3d 1088, 1088–93
(8th Cir. 2017) (invalidating NCA with independent contractor under Iowa law).
5. The pandemic may also be shifting other legal norms regarding noncompetes.
See Crystal Woods & Micala Bernardo, Restrictive Covenants and the Pandemic: An
Altered Landscape for Employers, LAB. DISH (June 2, 2021), https://www.labordish.com/
2021/06/restrictive-covenants-and-the-pandemic-an-altered-landscape-for-employers/#
page=1 [https://perma.cc/A9ZX-498U] (reporting a variety of legislative and judicial
developments, including heightened scrutiny of NCAs by the courts and a number of pending
bills that would further restrict their use).
6. See, e.g., The Labor Law Group Symposium on the Restatement of Employment
Law, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 245 (2017); Papers from the American Bar Foundation –
The Labor Law Group Conference on the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 16
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 359 (2012); Labor Law Group – U.C. Hastings Symposium on
the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2009).
7. See Alan Hyde, A Brief User’s Guide to Restatement of Employment Law
Chapter 8, Employee Obligations and Restrictive Covenants, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 623, 626-28, 630–31, 638–39, 642, 644 (2017); Michael Selmi, Trending and the
Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee Mobility, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 1369, 1375–76, 1379, 1385–88 (2015); Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent
Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 440, 445 (2012).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. §§ 187–188 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
9. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, The New Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the Law
of Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles Sullivan) with 2020
Vision, 50 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2020) (“But times are changing. In the last
decade, there has been a surge in public initiatives targeting employers’ use and enforcement
of restraints against employee competition—what I refer to as the ‘new enforcement
regime.’”).

679

58-3_SULLIVAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2021 4:09 PM

standards governing enforcement of postemployment restraints of trade—
dissatisfaction that has only increased in the years since.10 Nevertheless,
the Restatement has advanced the ball in noncompete law in at least some
respects,11 and one of its unnoticed innovations is the subject of this Article.
To set the stage for that discussion, it may help to recap recent
developments. Contrary to the traditional view that postemployment restraints
are efficiency-enhancing,12 the meta-critique of influential scholars is that
NCAs tend to restrict innovation and entrepreneurship.13 That perspective
was already gaining academic adherents and attention in state legislatures
by the time the Restatement was promulgated,14 and particularly obnoxious

10. Id.
11. For example, Professor Hyde praises the Restatement for “increasing the
evidentiary and persuasive burden on any plaintiff employer seeking to enforce a
noncompete,” thus “point[ing] the way to a more rigorous analysis in the states that
historically have enforced noncompetes, often on no greater showing than that the employee
signed them.” Hyde, supra note 7, at 627–28. And, in an earlier article, I recognized that
the Restatement tightened the criteria for modifying overly broad covenants to make them
reasonable although I criticized it for not going far enough. See Charles A. Sullivan,
Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1391, 1397–98 (2015). See infra
note 152.
12. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV.
383, 406–07 (1993). The essence of that argument was that, absent protection from future
competition by former employees, employers would operate at less than optimal scale in
order not to share trade secrets or customer contacts or would implement expensive
workarounds to protect their interests. See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The
Case for Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 967, 969–74 (2020).
13. Sometimes called the “Route 128” argument, the critique centers on the greater
success of Silicon Valley as compared to Boston’s Route 128; that disparity is attributed
in large part to innovation-enhancing “knowledge spillovers” resulting from the high
employee mobility enabled by California’s prohibition on employment noncompetes.
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 589–603 (1999).
Although Professor Gilson’s work is more than two decades old, newer scholarship has
built on that insight. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital
Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 853 (2015) (“Restrictions on
the flow of knowledge [through noncompetes and other devices] contaminate market flows
and diminish both the incentives to move efficiently in the market and the incentives to
innovate.”); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in HighTech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1238–40 (2018); ORLY LOBEL,
TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE
RIDING 51 (2013). See also On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory
of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 846, 862, 865–66 (2013) (noncompetes may
be self-defeating in terms of employer interests by dampening employees’ incentives
to improve their skills). But see Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 12, at 953 (“We argue that
this zero-enforcement position lacks a sound basis in theory or empirics.”).
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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examples of employer use of NCAs were drawing public scorn,15 law
enforcement interest,16 and legislative action.17
Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman has helpfully taxonomized these
recent legislative efforts as falling under three headings: “‘[1] vulnerable
worker bans’ that prohibit noncompetes with low-wage, low-skilled workers;
[2] ‘California-style bans’ that seek to void all forms of employee
noncompetes; and [3] ‘middle way’ statutes that impose select procedural
requirements and substantive limitations on how, where, and under what
conditions noncompetes may be imposed and enforced.”18
The first reform, banning noncompetes for “low-wage” workers, has
had the most success to date19 although there have been some enactments
shielding doctors—scarcely low-wage workers—and other health care
workers.20
While California-style abolition has not been widely successful,21 the
District of Columbia recently adopted a law that bars almost all noncompetes,
and even goes further than California in barring restrictions on competition
during employment. 22 And recent enactments in at least four other
jurisdictions show surprising support for more sweeping reform, and,

15. The poster child for this is Jimmy-John’s routine use of NCAs for its sandwich
makers. See Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete
Clause, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/
when-the-guy-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html [https://perma.cc/
D68V-7RXW].
16. Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1235.
17. See id. at 1231.
18. Id.
19. Professor Arnow-Richman lists seven states with such enactments; Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Washington, with
bills pending in several others. Id. at 1232 n.37. Since then, Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §
40.1-28.7:8 (2020); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.295 (2021); and Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 613.195598A.010 (2021), have joined the list as has the District of Columbia although
that ban is far broader. See infra note 22.
20. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-14p (2016). See also IND. CODE § 25-22.5-5.5-2(4)
(2020) (requiring noncompete agreements for physicians to, inter alia, provide for a right
to buy out the restriction at a “reasonable price”).
21. Ellen Rubin, Most States Still Enforce Noncompete Agreements—And It’s
Stifling Innovation, FORTUNE (June 26, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/06/26/
states-noncompete-agreements-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/PH5T-TTCR].
22. Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Amendment Act of 2020, 2020 D.C. Law
23-209. See New Year, New Rules: The District of Columbia’s New Ban on Non-Compete
Agreements, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=243ab964-ff62-4ace-9b8ba489898a2cd3 [https://perma.cc/Z2QB-QZ7X].
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perhaps even more startling, this includes both red and blue states.23 Thus,
Oklahoma now bars noncompetes, although it permits nonsolicitation
agreements;24 Hawaii bars them for the tech sector;25 and Idaho, after passing
legislation to strengthen such agreements, reversed field in the wake of
adverse reaction and repealed that law.26 Meanwhile, a multiyear effort
to reform Massachusetts law to bring it in line with the California model
failed but resulted in reforms that make the state much less hospitable to
NCAs.27
Massachusetts law and related but less comprehensive enactments in
several other states implement reforms such as limiting the length of

23. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1236–37.
24. Professor Arnow-Richman reports the Oklahoma story, where the legislature
passed amendments, the most recent in 2016, which permit nonsolicitation agreements,
while declaring all other forms of restraint “void and unenforceable,” making Oklahoma
a nonenforcement state. Id. at 1237.
25. HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(d) (2020).
26. Idaho enacted a “business friendly” noncompete law in 2016, mostly by rebuttably
presuming irreparable harm from breach, only to receive bad national press as making it
harder for start-ups in the state. See Nicole Snyder & A. Dean Bennett, Idaho Legislature
Repeals 2016 Changes to Non-Compete Law, EMPS.’ L. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018), https://
www.employerslawyersblog.com/2018/04/idaho-legislature-repeals-2016-changes-to-noncompete-law.html [https://perma.cc/53TH-AKHP]. Business leaders signed a letter asking the
governor and legislature to repeal the law, which promptly happened in 2018. S. 1287,
64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018); see Snyder & Bennett, supra.
27. It is not a coincidence that Massachusetts, the home to Route 128, should have
been a battleground between those who would abolish, or at least substantially limit noncompetes,
and those who prefer the traditional tests. As the legislative compromise finally emerged,
NCAs in that state remain generally permitted but subject to eight requirements:
(1) be in writing, signed, and expressly state the employee has a right to counsel;
(2) if entered into after being hired, provide “fair and reasonable consideration
independent from the continuation of employment”; (3) not be broader than
necessary to protect an employer’s trade secret, confidential information, and
goodwill; (4) not last more than one year; (5) provide a reasonable geographic
area that does not exceed the area the employee had a material presence in during
the last two years of employment; (6) provide a reasonable scope that is limited
to types of services provided by the employee during the last two years of
employment; (7) provide a “garden leave” clause, which requires the employer
to pay fifty-percent of the employee’s highest annualized base salary for the
restricted period; and (8) “be consonant with public policy.”
Kelly Krause, Comment, Turning Wisconn Valley into the Next Silicon Valley: Reforming
Wisconsin Non-Compete Law to Attract High-Tech Employers, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 237,
255 n.141 (2019) (referencing what is now MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 149, § 24L(b) (2018));
see also Michael G. Feblowitz, Note, Repaving Route 128: How New Legislation in
Massachusetts Impacts the Noncompete Debate, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2263, 2277–78 (2020).
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postemployment restraints28 and specifying notice29 and other conditions
for such agreements30 as well as tightening the requirements for a “reasonable”
restraint,31 and sometimes providing remedies beyond voiding the contract
for employer overreaching.32 Alone among those states, Massachusetts
also requires “garden leave”:33 payment to a former employee during the
restricted period—although arguably that provision may be easily avoided.34
And, of particular interest for this paper, Massachusetts bars enforcement
of noncompetes for employees laid off without cause.35 Beyond these
state enactments, there are also efforts for greater regulation at the federal
level,36 and the Uniform Law Commission has issued a recommended law
28. See ch. 149, § 24L(b)(iv) (limiting non-compete agreements to one year);
WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.62.020(2) (2019) (providing a rebuttable presumption of no more
than 18 months).
29. Massachusetts requires noncompetes to be in writing, signed by the employee,
and to explicitly advise the employee of her right to consult an attorney. See ch. 149, §
24L(b)(i).
30. Massachusetts requires “fair and reasonable consideration” above and beyond
continuation of employment if the agreement is not entered into at the outset of employment.
See ch. 149, § 24L(b)(ii). Professor Arnow-Richman characterizes these as “mid-term
modifications,” Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1239 n.69, and reports that both Oregon
and Washington require consideration beyond continued employment. See id. at 1239;
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.62.020(1)(a)(ii) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)(B) (2020)
(requiring such an agreement to be “entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement”
in the employee’s position).
31. Professor Arnow-Richman canvasses these enacted and proposed state reforms
more thoroughly. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1238–41.
32. Id. at 1241 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.62.080 (West 2019) (creating
a private right of action)).
33. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via
“Garden Leave,” 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293 (2016).
34. Chapter 149, section 24L(b)(vii) of the Massachusetts General Laws entitles
employees required to sit out to be paid 50% of their base salary during the restricted
period, although the statute provides that an agreement providing no such compensation
is valid so long as the employee receives “mutually-agreed upon consideration.” Ch. 149,
§ 24L(b)(vii). Arguably, whatever compensation the parties agreed to could be considered
to incorporate consideration for the relinquishment of garden leave.
35. Id. § 24L(c) (“A noncompetition agreement shall not be enforceable against the
following types of workers: . . . employees that have been terminated without cause or laid
off . . . .”). The statute provides no definition of cause.
36. Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executiveorder-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/ [https://perma.cc/VD9A-F7SF]
(asking, inter alia, the Federal Trade Commission to consider “curtail[ing] the unfair use
of non-compete clauses and other clauses or agreements that may unfairly limit worker
mobility”); Petition to the Federal Trade Commission for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker
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on noncompetes that addresses a variety of issues, including exempting
low-income workers.37
Largely unnoticed in this debate, however, was a pro-competitive
innovation of the Employment Restatement, which declared otherwise
reasonable NCAs unenforceable when the employee is terminated without
cause.38 This has enormous potential benefit for workers—especially in
an economy dealing with the disruptions of COVID-19. The number of
individuals laid off as a result of the closures is in the tens of millions,39
and it seems likely that millions will not regain their jobs when the crisis
abates.40 Given the pervasiveness of noncompetition agreements in the
United States, a substantial percentage of these are undoubtedly subject to
noncompetes,41 although layoffs seem to disproportionately affect lowerpaid workers who are less likely to have signed an NCA to begin with.42

Non-Compete Clauses, OPEN M KTS. INST. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.openmarkets
institute.org/publications/petition-3-20-2019 [https://perma.cc/UF6F-6W6B]. See generally
Lobel, supra note 2.
37. See UNIF. RESTRICTIVE EMP. AGREEMENT ACT § 5 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2021).
Section 5 declares many restrictive employment agreements unenforceable for many lowwage workers. Id. It permits them for higher-wage workers when the worker “(A) voluntarily
quits without good cause attributable to the employer; (B) is terminated for substantial
misconduct or individual performance related cause; or (C) has completed the agreed work
or finished the term of the contract.” Id.
38. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
39. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Temporary Termination: A Layoff Law Blueprint for
the COVID Era, 64 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2021) (“Between March and July of 2020,
over 50 million individuals lost their jobs in the wake of government shut down orders and
the cessation of ordinary commercial life.”).
40. Jeanna Smialek & Alan Rappeport, Fed Leaves Rates Unchanged and Projects
Years of High Unemployment, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/business/economy/federal-reserve-rates-unemployment.html [https://perma.cc/
YQ3R-UG9X]. In their first economic projections this year, Federal officials indicated
that they expect the unemployment rate to end 2020 at 9.3 percent and remain elevated for
some time, coming in at 5.5 percent in 2022. Id. That would be well above the level they
expect to prevail over the longer run in a healthy economy and far above the historically
low jobless rates that preceded the virus. Id.
41. OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 6 (2016) (estimating that 30 million workers are
bound by noncompetes); Evan Starr, JJ Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements
in the U.S. Labor Force, 64 J.L. & ECON. 53, 60 (2021); see also Christopher B. Seaman,
Noncompetes and Other Post-Employment Restraints on Competition: Empirical Evidence
from Trade Secret Litigation, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1183 (2021) (providing an empirical
study of noncompetes in trade secret litigation showing that NCAs “are more frequently
enforced against technical and sales personnel than high-ranking corporate executives
[and] . . . are common for employees with a base salary below $100,000 per year”).
42. Winnie Hu, Juliana Kim & Jo Corona, ‘It Makes Me Angry’: These Are the Jobless
in a City Filled with Wealth, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/07/nyregion/bronx-unemployment-covid.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://
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It is also true that most former employers, assuming they survive, may not
seek to enforce these NCAs. But not only may the mere existence of the
NCA tend to suppress competition, 43 but some employers will seek to
enforce such agreements, which will raise the question whether an employee
laid off by her employer remains subject to any noncompete she signed.
According to the Restatement, the answer should be no: if the employee
either quits voluntarily or is fired for “cause,” an otherwise reasonable
NCA is enforceable.44 In contrast, an NCA is not enforceable against an
employee laid off in a corporate downsizing.45 However, as we will see,
the drafters were more than a little cagey in framing the rule, and its vague
phrasing may limit its impact.46 Further, the case authority on which the
Restatement rule is based is not robust. Nevertheless, refusing to enforce
noncompetes in these circumstances seems to be the correct approach for
the courts and should be added to the various legislative reforms now
percolating.
II. RESTATEMENT § 8.06
Consistent with the law in most states, § 8.06 of the Restatement of
Employment Law generally approves restrictive covenants “reasonably
tailored” to specified legitimate employer interests.47 However, it carves
out exceptions for instances in which “(a) the employer discharges the
employee on a basis that makes enforcement of the covenant inequitable,
[and] (b) the employer acted in bad faith in requiring or invoking the
covenant.”48 Since there is a separate exception for material breach by the
perma.cc/BAG3-Y25M] (“Pandemic job losses have disproportionately hurt low-paid
service workers [in New York] who tend to be poor and people of color.”).
43. See infra note 152.
44. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
45. Id.
46. There may also be situations in which the doctrines of impracticability or
frustration of purpose might be invoked to challenge an NCA, but that question is beyond
the scope of this Article. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. ch. 11, § 266 (AM. L.
INST. 1981).
47. The Restatement defines employer protected interests in § 8.07(b): “(1) trade
secrets, as defined in § 8.02, and other protectable confidential information that does not
meet the definition of trade secret; (2) customer relationships; (3) investment in the employee’s
reputation in the market; or (4) purchase of a business owned by the employee.” RESTATEMENT
OF EMP. L. § 8.07(b) (AM. L. INST. 2015).
48. Section 8.06 provides in full:
Except as otherwise provided by other law or applicable professional rules, a
covenant in an agreement between an employer and a former employee restricting
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employer,49 these paragraphs envision some other basis making court
enforcement inappropriate,50 but the vague phrasing renders the meaning
of these terms unclear.
That’s in part because the two provisions each employ protean terms—
“inequitable” and “bad faith”—but also because it is not clear whether
they address two different situations.51 Paragraph (a) is aimed at scenarios
ex post the NCA while paragraph (b)’s use of the word “requiring” suggests
an ex ante focus on the moment the contract was made. But (b)’s use of
“invoking” may indicate that even a covenant obtained in good faith may
be unenforceable if asserted in bad faith. Thus, both “bad faith” and
“inequitable” can come into play in determining whether to enforce a
covenant.
Whatever the deficiencies of the blackletter, the Restatement’s comments
establish that the language is designed to bar enforcement of a restraint if
the former employee’s working activities is enforceable only if it is reasonably
tailored in scope, geography, and time to further a protectable interest of the
employer, as defined in § 8.07, unless:
(a) the employer discharges the employee on a basis that makes
enforcement of the covenant inequitable;
(b) the employer acted in bad faith in requiring or invoking the covenant;
(c) the employer materially breached the underlying employment
agreement; or
(d) in the geographic region covered by the restriction, a great public need
for the special skills and services of the former employee outweighs
any legitimate interest of the employer in enforcing the covenant.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
Interpreting and enforcing geographic restrictions in NCAs is likely to become more
complicated after the pandemic as remote work becomes more common. See Woods & Bernardo,
supra note 5 (“[R]emote work situations involving geographic-based non-compete agreements
is [sic] likely to be an area of fertile ground for legal challenges to restrictive covenants in
2021.”).
49. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
50. Unlike most other employment law issues, the effect of arbitration agreements
on this question need not long detain us. While employment contracts usually provide for
individual arbitration of disputes, the typical clause carves out the ability of the employer
to seek injunctive relief for violation of an NCA, and postemployment restraints of trade
continue to be enforced (or not) mainly in court. See Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and
the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 1381, 1421 (2008) (“Although an
arbitrator may be empowered to award injunction relief, arbitration is typically not
conducive to facilitating speedy resolution or providing interim remedies” and employers
often desire to join the new employer, who will not be bound by the agreement.); cf. Archer
& White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 656 (2021) (noting that given the carve-out for injunctive relief, there
was no unmistakable delegation of the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator).
51. That is not to say that some courts might not invoke “bad faith” when dealing
with enforcement in the termination context. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06(b) (AM.
L. INST. 2015).
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the employer terminates the employee without cause even though, for an
at-will worker, such action would not be a breach by the employer.52 In
other words, such an employer does not need cause to terminate but does
need cause to enforce an NCA when the employee does not leave voluntarily.
Comment f, dealing with terminated employees, provides that “restrictive
covenants are generally enforceable against employees who have been
discharged for cause”53 but such “covenants are generally unenforceable
against employees who are terminated without cause or who quit employment
for cause attributable to the employer.”54
This latter phrasing is reminiscent of concepts used for purposes of
unemployment insurance, which bar eligibility on a variety of bases,
including quitting without good cause, variously defined.55 Comment f,
however, makes clear that “cause” in this context is performance based.56

52. Discharge without cause of an employee working on a definite term contract
would bar enforcement under § 8.05(c)’s exception for employer material breach. See
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06(c) (AM. L. INST. 2015).
53. Id. § 8.06 cmt. f.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(a) (2020) (“An individual shall be
ineligible for benefits: . . . (2)(A) If . . . the individual has left suitable work voluntarily
and without good cause attributable to the employer . . . .”). “The unemployment
compensation system is often characterized as one designed to provide benefits to workers
who are ‘unemployed through no fault of their own.’” Deborah Maranville, Workplace
Mythologies and Unemployment Insurance: Exit, Voice and Exhausting All Reasonable
Alternatives to Quitting, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 459, 485 (2002). To that end, an employee
discharged for “willful misconduct” has no right to benefits, while an employee laid off
for economic reasons does. Somewhere in the middle are employees who quit for any
number of reasons, some of which might be described as fault attributable to the employer.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 268.095(3)(a) (2019) (“(a) A good reason caused by the employer
for quitting is a reason: (1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the
employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel an
average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
employment.”). See generally Maranville, supra. Other statutes focus less on “cause” than
“misconduct” as rendering a former employee ineligible. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 61-6-14.1 (2021) (“As used in this chapter, misconduct is: (1) Failure to obey orders,
rules, or instructions, or failure to discharge the duties for which an individual was employed;
or (2) Substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and
obligations to the employer; or (3) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of
an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of an employee; or (4) Carelessness
or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability or wrongful
intent.”).
56. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f.
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It does so by cross-referring to Restatement § 2.04(a), which addresses
when an employer may escape a definite term contract:
An employer has cause for early termination of an agreement for a definite
term of employment if the employee has materially breached the agreement,
including by persistent neglect of duties; by engaging in misconduct or
other malfeasance, including gross negligence; or by being unable to perform the
duties of the position due to a long-term disability.57

This rigorous definition, which excludes terminations in the context of
layoffs or downsizing, can be contrasted with paragraph (b) of § 2.04,
which has a looser definition of cause for contracts without a definite term
and includes a “significant change in the employer’s economic circumstances
[such] that the employer no longer has a business need for the employee’s
services.”58 The pointed failure of § 8.06 to cross-reference § 2.04(b) makes
clear that the Restatement would not permit enforcement of a covenant
against an employee terminated in a reduction in force, no matter how
legitimate. Rather, the employee must resign voluntarily59 or be fired for
her own material breach in order to continue to be subject to a reasonably
tailored NCA.60
Left largely unaddressed is the middle ground where an employer modifies
the terms and conditions of employment (something it is normally permitted
to do for at-will workers) leading the employee to quit. Were the employer
to have acted to induce the resignation, we might speak in terms of constructive
discharge. Indeed, comment f describes “cause attributable to the employer”
as “a form of ‘constructive discharge’” but does not address whether the
employer has to intend the employee to leave for that concept to apply.61
57. Id. § 2.04(a).
58. Id. § 2.04(b).
59. By its reference to “constructive discharge,” comment f makes clear that some
resignations may be viewed as involuntary for the purpose of this rule. But that notion is
problematic in this context. See discussion infra Section VII.
60. In the § 8.06(a) context, this is a somewhat odd use of the concept of “material
breach” because the usual consequence of so labeling a breach is to relieve the injured
party of its reciprocal obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 237 cmt. a
(AM. L. INST. 1981). In the at-will setting, the employer has no reciprocal obligation to
continue employment and the employee can be discharged for any breach or no breach.
See also Prop. Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891 S.W.2d 153, 156–57 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (exploring the meaning of cause in the NCA context and apparently viewing cause
as limited to employee breach of the contract of employment). Section 204(a) also includes
as “cause” a no-fault discharge when the employee is disabled and so unable to perform
her duties. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 204(a). Such employee nonperformance is typically
viewed not as a breach but as excused, which would in turn excuse any employer reciprocal
obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 262 (AM. L. INST. 1981). Such situations
will rarely if ever be implicated in connection with enforcing an NCA.
61. Illustration 15 deals with constructive discharge by positing that the NCA is
unenforceable when the employee is demoted and deprived of all his staff assistance but
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As for the justification for the rule, the comment is terse. It explains:
“An opposite rule would have the perverse consequence of enabling an
employer to terminate rather than retain an employee who is performing
satisfactorily and then restrict the discharged employee’s ability to secure
new employment.”62 This is less an explanation than a repetition of the
view that the result would be unfair. The following sentence states: “By
the same token, an employer should not be able to obtain enforcement of
a restrictive covenant when the employer acts in bad faith, such as by
securing the employee’s execution of the covenant after planning to
discharge the employee.”63 That is a compelling example of bad faith64 but
casts no light on other instances of bad faith in “requiring” an NCA much
less in “invoking” one.
Several illustrations follow, but Illustration 13 presents the case of the
employee discharged for cause,65 and 14 and 15 are unenlightening, especially
because they not only involve nonenforcement of a noncompete but also
forfeiture of apparently earned benefits.66 Neither explains either blackletter

does not explicitly deal with the employer’s intent to trigger a resignation. RESTATEMENT
OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f, illus. 15 (AM. L. INST. 2015). However, the cross reference to comment
c of section 5.01, dealing with the public policy tort, may suggest that there must be at least an
intent beyond a normal reorganization to increase efficiency. See discussion infra Section
VII.
62. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
63. Id.
64. Normal contract analysis would seem to also permit the employee to rescind
the NCA for misrepresentation in this scenario. Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
section 161, provides that:
A person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion
that the fact does not exist in the following cases only: . . .
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of
the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the
contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 161 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
65. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f, illus. 13 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
66. The Illustrations are:
14. X’s employee E, who has access to X’s trade secrets, signs a reasonable
restrictive covenant as part of an employment agreement with X. The covenant
states that E will forfeit special severance benefits if E competes with X within
one year of leaving X’s employ. X fires E without cause, and E then begins working
for a competitor. X may not enforce the covenant against E.
15. Same facts as Illustration 14, except that E quits because X, without cause,
has constructively discharged (see § 5.01, Comment c) E by demoting E and depriving
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provision although both suggest that enforcement is never appropriate
when a discharge is not for cause.67
In sum, the Restatement, despite the cryptic phrasing of the blackletter,
would bar an employer from enforcing an agreement not to compete, no
matter how “reasonable,” unless the former employee voluntarily quit or
was terminated for her own material breach.68 Given the fallout from the
COVID crisis, general recognition of such a principle might invalidate
thousands of otherwise-enforceable noncompetes.
But a Restatement is, of course, not “law,” 69 and even reading the
Restatement to adopt such a conclusion is not enough to assure the
unenforceability of noncompetes in this situation. That depends on what
the courts will do.
III. THE COMMON LAW UNDERLYING THE RESTATEMENT
The case authority regarding the effect of a termination without cause
on the enforceability of a NCA is both fragmentary and undertheorized.70
Although Restatements may adopt the “better rule,” whether or not it is
the “majority rule,”71 the Reporters’ Notes seem to clearly view some version
him of all customary staff assistance. Because E quit for cause attributable to
the employer, X may not enforce the covenant against E.
See id. § 8.06 cmt. f, illus. 14, 15. The Reporters’ Notes state that Illustrations 14 and 15
are based on Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y.
1979), which is an atypical example since it involved not only an NCA but the forfeiture
of otherwise-earned benefits. Further, the decision was influenced by a “powerfully
articulated congressional policy” in ERISA against forfeiture of such benefits. See id.
§ 8.06 reporters’ note to comment f (quoting Post, 397 N.E.2d at 360).
67. See id. § 8.06 cmt. f, illus. 14, 15.
68. See supra note 60.
69. The ALI cautions against interpreting Restatements as one would a statute. See
AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR
ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 5 (2005) (“Although Restatements
are expected to aspire toward the precision of statutory language, they are also intended to
reflect the flexibility and capacity for development and growth of the common law. They
are therefore phrased not in the mandatory terms of a statute but in the descriptive terms
of a judge announcing the law to be applied in a given case.”).
70. See Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete. . .”:
The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS.
& COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (“[C]ourts have not established any clear rules to provide judges,
lawyers and parties with guidance in termination cases. The law in this area is relatively
undeveloped, perhaps because so few termination cases have made their way through the
reported decisions or the courts have not given them much reasoned analysis.”).
71. That does not mean that a given Restatement simply puts forth what the Institute
determines to be the majority rule. The ALI explains:
A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive
to and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate
or inconsistent with the law as a whole. Faced with such precedent, an Institute
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of its formulation as adopted by “most courts,” or at least most courts that
have addressed the issue.72 Here is their entire textual summary of the
relevant case law:73
The case law specifically addressing the enforceability of reasonable restrictive
covenants against discharged employees is quite variable. Relatively few jurisdictions
have squarely ruled that such covenants are enforceable regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the termination of employment. Courts generally consider the
circumstances surrounding the employee’s termination to be an important, if not
decisive, factor in determining whether the restrictive covenant should be enforced.
Most courts will not enforce an otherwise reasonable restrictive covenant against
an employee who is discharged without cause, who quits for cause attributable
to the employer (a form of “constructive discharge”), or who is let go because of
a downturn in business. In addition, a number of courts have expressly distinguished
the enforceability of restrictive covenants when the employee was fired for cause
from the enforceability of restrictive covenants against an employee discharged
without cause.74

Reporter is not compelled to adhere to what Herbert Wechsler called “a
preponderating balance of authority” but is instead expected to propose the better
rule and provide the rationale for choosing it. A significant contribution of the
Restatements has also been anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending
and expression of that development in a manner consistent with previously
established principles.
AM. L. INST., supra note 69.
72. The Notes function as a kind of legislative history albeit one with the usual
problems of resorting to such authority to interpret the blackletter. This is compounded by the
fact that, unlike the blackletter and the comments, the Notes are not “official” ALI documents.
See id. at 45 (“Unlike the Introduction, Introductory Notes, black letter, and Comment
(including Illustrations), the Reporter’s (or Reporters’) Notes are regarded as the work of
the Reporter (or Reporters).”).
73. See also RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 reporters’ note to comment f (“Many
courts have refused, or stated in dicta that they would refuse, to enforce a restrictive covenant
against a discharged employee when the employer has acted in bad faith.”).
74. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Notes also state that New York
may or may not adhere to an “employee choice doctrine,” which the Restatement rejects.
Id. Under that rule “the court will enforce a restrictive covenant without regard to its
reasonableness if the employer can demonstrate it would have allowed the employee to
continue working and receive the benefits of the employment contract but the employee
nevertheless quit to work for a competitor.” Id. The doctrine is apparently limited to foreclosing
receipt of an equity stake or other postemployment benefits. See Devivo Assocs., Inc., v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. App’x 661, 663 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Under New York law,
courts will enforce a contract provision that conditions receipt of postemployment benefits
upon compliance with a restrictive covenant without regard to reasonableness unless the
employee was terminated involuntarily and without cause.” (citing Morris v. Schroder
Cap. Mgmt. Int’l, 859 N.E.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. 2006))).
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Although the Notes recognize a minority position, it is not a strong one
because only one of the five cases cited for enforcing covenants without
regard to the reason for termination in fact focused on the issue, and that
case’s result was arguably dictated by a statute.75
But neither is the line of authority represented by “most courts” very
robust. The italicized sentence is supported by ten cases from nine
jurisdictions.76 However: the relevant passage in two cases is described as
75. The strongest holding is Twenty Four Collection v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062,
1062–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (enforcing a noncompetition covenant triggered by a
“termination, voluntarily or involuntarily” and declaring that “[t]he only authority the court
possesses over the terms of a non-competitive agreement is to determine, as the statute
provides, the reasonableness of its time and area limitations”). However, as the quoted
language indicates, this decision was rendered under a Florida statute that the court viewed
as dictating its result. See id. at 1063.
The other citations, introduced by a “cf.” signal, are either inapposite, Weber v. Tillman,
913 P.2d 84, 91–93 (Kan. 1996) (finding that the employee voluntarily left), or involve
decisions that ignore the fact that the defendant was terminated without cause. See Ins.
Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 190–91 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Cellular One, Inc.
v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30, 31–34 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 378
A.2d 1164, 1166–67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
Not cited by the Reporters but another decision where the court simply ignored the
reason for discharge is James Roberson & Penhall Co., Inc. v. C.P. Allen Const. Co., Inc.,
50 So. 3d 471, 473–74 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
76. Bailey v. King, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ark. 1966) (explaining that a firing
“without reasonable cause” might bar enforcement but finding “valid reasons” for ending
the employment); Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (“[T]he implied promise of good faith inherent in every contract precludes the
enforcement of a non-competition clause when the employee is dismissed without
cause.”); Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Iowa 1984) (recognizing that
discharge is a factor cutting against an injunction) (citing Holloway v. Brown, 155 S.E.
917 (Ga. 1930)); Orion Broad., Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198, 201 (W.D. Ky.
1979) (distinguishing between an employee who voluntarily resigns and one who is
involuntarily terminated; holding an employee to an NCA that deprives her of h er
livelihood at the “whim” of her employer is “an example of industrial peonage which has
no place in today’s society”); Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 215 A.2d 222, 225–26 (Md.
1965) (holding that restrictive covenant imposed “undue hardship” on employee in part
because employee was fired “through no fault of his own”); Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360–61 (N.Y. 1979) (refusing to enforce a provision
requiring forfeiture of retirement benefits for completion when the employee was terminated
without cause, in part because of the policy reflected in ERISA); Insulation Corp. of Am.
v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“The employer who fires an
employee for failing to perform in a manner that promotes the employer’s business interests
deems the employee worthless . . . . [Thus,] the need to protect itself from the former employee
is diminished by the fact that the employee’s worth to the corporation is presumably
insignificant. Under such circumstances, we conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter
of law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that which it has effectively
discarded as worthless to its legitimate business interests.”); Cent. Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984) (explaining that the circumstances of an
employee’s departure are a factor affecting the reasonableness analysis); Sec. Servs., Inc.
v. Priest, 507 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (refusing to enforce a restrictive
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“dicta”; 77 other decisions speak in terms of the reason for termination
being a “factor” in the reasonableness analysis rather than a free-standing
rule; 78 and some tie it to the clean hands doctrine in equity, perhaps
suggesting it may not be relevant in a legal action for damages.79 Further,
most of the cases are older and some are from lower-level courts.80 And
not all of them consider a restraint that, by its terms, applies regardless of
the reason for termination, and so are arguably distinguishable when such
language is present.81 Thus, the “most courts” rule is not impressive from
a judicial nose-counting perspective, although several cases not cited by
the Reporters also provide some support for the rule.82
covenant when the employer discharged the employee without cause after obtaining the
employee’s former customers for itself).
The Notes also cite In re UFG Int’l, Inc., 225 B.R. 51, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998), which
speaks of not enforcing the covenant when the employer “hobble[s] his employee by
terminating him without cause.” Nevertheless, the employer in that case appeared to be in
material breach of the agreement by the termination, which would fall within the § 8.06(c)
exception to enforcement. Id.
77. See Bailey v. King, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ark. 1966); Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at
35.
78. Ma & Pa, Inc., 342 N.W.2d at 502; Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735; Ingram, 678
S.W.2d at 35 (explaining that the circumstances of an employee’s departure is a factor
affecting the reasonableness analysis); see also Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co.,
154 So. 2d 151, 155 (Miss. 1963) (“Had the chancellor found that appellant’s discharge
was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, he could have refused to lend the aid of equity in
enforcing the contract.”); Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 521
(S.D. 1996) (applying balancing test when employee was terminated without cause).
79. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d at 35 (“[A] discharge which is arbitrary, capricious or in
bad faith clearly has a bearing on whether a court of equity should enforce a non competition covenant.” (citing Frierson, 154 So. 2d at 155)); see also Chi. Towel Co. v.
Reynolds, 152 S.E. 200, 201 (W. Va. 1930) (denying an injunction on the basis of the
“unclean hands” doctrine; the employee had been discharged without notice on the ground
that his salary was too high).
80. See e.g., Priest, 507 S.W.2d at 595; Reynolds, 152 S.E. at 201.
81. See, e.g., Bishop, 644 N.E.2d at 36 (refusing to enforce a noncompetition
agreement against an employee fired without cause although the employment contract
authorized termination by either party “with or without cause”); Ma & Pa, Inc., 342
N.W.2d at 502; Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1983). In contrast, Twenty Four
Collection v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), looked to precisely
such language in finding a clause enforceable despite a no-cause discharge.
82. See Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646, 653
(Mont. 2011) (“[A]n employer normally lacks a legitimate business interest in a covenant
when it chooses to end the employment relationship. Maintenance of the employment
relationship represents an employer’s best method to prevent competition from an employee.”)
(citing Rao, 718 F.2d at 224); Econ. Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747,
748 (Mass. 1935) (“A petition [for an injunction] will not be granted if the conduct of the
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The Reporters cite a separate line of cases in support of paragraph (b):
“Many courts have refused, or stated in dicta that they would refuse,
to enforce a restrictive covenant against a discharged employee when the
employer has acted in bad faith.”83 These cases can be sorted into several
categories, but few are very helpful as to when enforcement is in bad faith.
Thus, several refuse to enforce an agreement when the employer is itself
in material breach,84 which is the province of § 8.06(c) and a standard
contract law principle.85 Others enforce a covenant but have dicta suggesting
a different result if bad faith were present without indicating what bad
faith would consist of in this context.86
More helpful are four cases, most in dicta, recognizing that enforcement
would be inequitable if the employer extracts an NCA while already
planning to terminate the employee and thus eliminate her competition.87

plaintiff is savored with injustice touching the transaction, even though there is no sufficient
ground for the rescission of the contract.”); see also Frierson, 154 So. 2d at 155 (finding
just cause for discharge but noting that “[h]ad the chancellor found that appellant’s
discharge was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, he could have refused to lend the aid
of equity in enforcing the contract.”).
Rao could also be cited for this proposition but is viewed by the Reporters as more of a
bad faith decision since the termination was claimed to be effected to prevent vesting of
an ownership interest in the medical practice, a classic example of violating the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Rao, 718 F.2d at 222–24.
83. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 reporters’ note to comment f (AM. L. INST.
2015).
84. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sisco, No. CA 98-751, 1999 WL 328903, at
*6–7 (Ark. Ct. App. May 19, 1999); C.G. Caster Co. v. Regan, 410 N.E.2d 422, 426–27
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (N.D. Ill. 2000);
Dunning v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 91 C 2502, 1997 WL 222891, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 24, 1997).
85. A standard remedy for material breach is the power of the injured party to
declare the breached contract at an end. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 237
(AM. L. INST. 1981) (stating that an uncured material breach permits suspension of injured
party’s duty of performance); see also id. § 242 (noting that “total” breach discharges that
duty).
86. Rsch. & Trading Corp. v. Pfuhl, No. 12527, 1992 WL 345465, at *11–13 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 18, 1992); Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987);
Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984).
87. See Robinson v. Comput. Servicenters, Inc., 346 So. 2d 940, 943 (Ala. 1977) (refusing
to enforce a restrictive covenant when, at the time the covenant was executed, the
employer planned to soon discharge the employee); Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d
888, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that hiring and “after a very short time”
terminating an at-will worker without cause “might be deemed unconscionable and a court
of equity would not permit its perpetuation by entry of an injunction”); Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 825–26 (Utah 1951) (enforcing restrictive covenant when
termination was without cause but suggesting an exception for covenants imposed “‘with
intent on the part of the employer that the employment would be only long enough to bind
the employee to the covenant, and with a view only of preventing him from working
elsewhere’” (quoting Wark v. Ervin Press Corp., 48 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1931)));
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A concrete example but surely a rare one. 88 Another case involves a
noncompetition clause sprung on the employee after he had been induced
to quit his previous employment;89 however, given the pervasiveness of
noncompetes today, few current employees could make a plausible claim
of surprise. Three of the cited cases involve claims that the employer was
motivated to deprive the employee of an otherwise-earned benefit;90 that’s
a standard application of the duty but rarely applicable in the NCA setting.91
Two others are hard to classify.92
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (explaining that “if
an employer hired an employee at will, obtained a covenant not to compete, and then
terminated the employee, without cause, to arbitrarily restrict competition, . . . such
conduct would constitute bad faith.”). See also Edin v. Jostens, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 691, 694
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (enforcement inequitable when “management induced [the
defendant] into allowing his current contract to expire without signing the new contract,
then terminated him for failing to timely sign the new contract”); Crowell v. Woodruff,
245 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Ky. 1951) (“The inequity of the plaintiff’s plea for specific
performance lies in the fact that having exacted the harsh covenant, he discharged his
employee within a brief time.”).
88. Not explicitly addressed in the cases is the possibility that that the employer’s
staffing reflects a sincere hope to succeed with its business plan but whose use of NCAs
essentially buys an insurance policy against competition should it be less successful and
be compelled to cut its workforce.
89. Am. Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Carter, 462 P.2d 838, 841 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (finding
no abuse of discretion in denying an injunction when “plaintiff had unclean hands in the
formation of this contract” because “plaintiff admits to having successfully induced
defendant to leave his previous job and to having him sign the subject agreement on his
first day’s work”).
90. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 222–24 (7th Cir. 1983) (when employer terminated
defendant to prevent his exercising his rights under a stock-option plan, that bad faith will
bar enforcement of an NCA). The Notes also cite Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., 432 N.E.2d
566, 572–74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982), but, although the court there found the forfeiture
of retirement benefits inequitable, there seems to be no suggestion of bad faith by plaintiff.
91. The Restatement of Employment Law section 2.07(c) states that:
In any employment relationship, including at-will employment, the employer’s
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing includes the duty not to terminate or
seek to terminate the employment relationship for the purpose of:
(1) preventing the vesting or accrual of an employee right or benefit . . . .
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 2.07(c) (AM. L. INST. 2015). See infra note 142.
92. In Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 975–76 (Miss. 1992),
the court found a breach of the duty of good faith in withholding commissions and refused
to enforce the noncompete for a variety of reasons, including, apparently, the unfairness
of the discharge when the employee had acted in his employer’s best interest. Empiregas,
Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 975-76 (Miss. 1992). See Lantech.com, LLC
v. Yarbrough, No. 3:06-CV-334-JDM, 2006 WL 3323222, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2006)
(refusing to enforce an NCA when the termination without cause “violate [d] its significant
representations to [the employee] and its own corporate human resources policy”). Yarbrough
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Finally, the Notes cite a small cluster of cases for the proposition that
“a number of courts have expressly distinguished the enforceability of
restrictive covenants when the employee was fired for cause from the
enforceability of restrictive covenants against an employee discharged
without cause.”93 These opinions add little to the previous authority.94
In short, although there is case support for both paragraphs (a) and (b),
it is scarcely impressive. And there is no consistent rationale underlying
any of the cases in either the “inequitable” or “bad faith” category, the courts
refusing to enforce having provided a grab-bag of explanations.
In no particular order, some courts seem to believe that a no-cause
discharge somehow bears on the legitimacy of the employer’s interests.95
Other courts, most explicitly some of the bad faith decisions, seem to
ground their result in opposing employer opportunism96 and enforcing the
employee’s probable expectations under the rubric of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.97 Yet other courts focus on the hardship to the
employee separate and apart from any contract terms.98
A number of the cases speak in terms of refusing to grant equitable
relief, but they fail to explain what makes enforcement of the agreement
inequitable.99 However, they may be looking to a kind of fault notion:
any competitive threat is posed solely by virtue of the employer’s actions
because, by terminating the employee, it caused the harm it now seeks to
be relieved of.

was later affirmed: that factual finding was permissible and Kentucky law permitted an
equity court to deny specific enforcement when the employee’s discharge had been unfair.
Lantech.com, LLC v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App’x 769 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Crowell v.
Woodruff, 245 S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1951)).
93. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
94. One of the cases cited was also listed under the “most courts” rubric, Bishop v.
Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33, 36–37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), but two provide
some additional support. See Prop. Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891 S.W.2d 153,
157–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming refusal to enforce restrictive covenant in equity
when employee was terminated without cause); Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski,
553 N.W.2d 513, 521 (S.D. 1996) (applying balancing test when employee was terminated
without cause).
As for Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia, 414 S.E.2d 599, 601 (Va. 1992), the
Reporters cite it not for the proposition that covenants will not be enforced when the employee
is terminated without cause but rather that the courts will construe ambiguous covenants
narrowly when possible. In that decision, the Virginia Supreme Court held that nonrenewal of
a contract did not trigger a noncompete, which applied only when the termination was for
cause. Id. at 601.
95. See infra note 107.
96. See infra note 132.
97. See infra note 139.
98. See infra note 127.
99. See infra note 120.
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Other decisions talk of no-cause discharges as destroying mutuality of
obligation.100 Still another explanation looks to something like estoppel:
one court viewed a non-cause discharge as reflecting the employer’s view
that the employee was “worthless,” which undercut the claim that he posed a
competitive threat.101
In short, the “majority rule” courts lack any unified justification for their
holdings and, at least at first glance, none of the various possibilities
articulated by the various opinions seems persuasive as a matter of
traditional contract analysis.102 At the same time, the intuition underlying
these cases seems quite plausible. Is it possible to articulate a rationale
that would justify such a result for future courts103 and, perhaps in the process,
provide a clearer rule than one that would invalidate a clause when the
termination was “inequitable”?
IV. CANVASSING THE RATIONALES
The Restatement provides that a termination without performancerelated “cause” is sufficient to deprive the employer of the benefit of
an otherwise valid restrictive covenant.104 Certainly, employer economic
concerns are insufficient.105 How to justify such a rule? We can put to
one side courts that do not worry about doctrine at all but just announced
the result, presumably because the answer is self-evident.106
Other opinions “fight the hypothetical,” that is, they conclude that a nocause discharge undermines the legitimacy of the employer’s interests.
For example, one decision thought that a termination without cause showed

100. See infra note 113.
101. See infra note 108.
102. It may seem odd to worry about the consistency of a rule favoring employees
with general contract doctrine when employment law often twists standard doctrine to
favor employers. E.g., Hanson v. Cent. Show Printing Co., 130 N.W.2d 654, 655–56 (Iowa
1964) (articulating the traditional rule that, absent an express term of employment, “additional”
consideration is necessary to bind the employer to something more than an at-will
commitment).
103. Id. at 657–58.
104. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
105. See supra note 58.
106. See Orion Broad., Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198, 201 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (holding
an employee to an NCA that deprives her of her livelihood at the “whim” of her employer
is “an example of industrial peonage which has no place in today’s society.”).
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the employer had no such interest.107 Another viewed a non-cause discharge
as reflecting the employer’s view that the employee was “worthless.”108
It is certainly true that a noncompete clause may be unreasonable in the
circumstances: if the employee’s termination were part of her employer’s
exiting the business, say, there would be nothing for the ex-employee to
compete with. But the employer’s basis for protection will rarely vary
depending on why the employee left. To see this, imagine the employer’s
legitimate interest is the employer’s investment in facilitating the relationship
between customers and the departing employee; to protect this, restraints
are typically reasonable if they provide the employer an adequate opportunity
to demonstrate that a replacement can provide equally good or better
service.109 The reason for the departing employee’s termination does not
really undercut this interest, and the same can be said for protecting trade
secrets or other confidential information.110
If there’s a point to this argument, it must be that the employer had another
way to protect itself—retaining the employee—and there is something
unfair about choosing to invoke a covenant not to compete against the
terminated employee rather than simply keeping her on. Having one’s
cake and eating it too comes to mind. But, needless to say, there is no
general contract law principle that forbids monopolizing cakes, and contracting
parties often seek to obtain the sweet without the bitter.
Other courts look more explicitly to doctrine, but the framing in the
cases is muddy at best. In Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., the New York Court of Appeals invoked not only ERISA’s policy
against forfeiting pension benefits but also the state’s own rules disapproving
forfeitures in order to negate an NCA that conditioned pension benefits

107. Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646, 653 (Mont.
2011) (“[A]n employer normally lacks a legitimate business interest in a covenant when it
chooses to end the employment relationship. Maintenance of the employment relationship
represents an employer’s best method to prevent competition from an employee.”).
108. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[I]t
is unreasonable as a matter of law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over
that which it has effectively discarded as worthless to its legitimate business interests.”).
Interestingly, given the defendant’s performance problems, this case could have been viewed
as a discharge for cause.
109. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.07 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
110. Recall that the Restatement recognizes four legitimate employer interests, the
most common of which are protection of trade secrets/confidential information and customer
relationships. See id. § 8.07(b)(1), (2); supra note 47. The employer’s interest in protecting
both would seem to survive termination for any reason. Arguably, the third, the employer’s
“investment in the employee’s reputation in the market,” and perhaps the fourth, “purchase
of a business owned by the employee,” might be affected by the reason for termination.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.07(b)(3), (4) (AM. L. INST. 2015).
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on not competing.111 Whatever the power of any forfeiture analysis,112 it
will have little application across the mine run of noncompetes which do
not involve anything that could conventionally be called a forfeiture.
The same court also invoked the doctrine of “mutuality of obligation”
to support its result, writing:
Acknowledging the tension between the freedom of individuals to contract, and
the reluctance to see one barter away his freedom, the State enforces limited
restraints on an employee’s employment mobility where a mutuality of obligation
is freely bargained for by the parties. An essential aspect of that relationship,
however, is the employer’s continued willingness to employ the party covenanting
not to compete. Where the employer terminates the employment relationship
without cause, however, his action necessarily destroys the mutuality of obligation on
which the covenant rests as well as the employer’s ability to impose a forfeiture.
An employer should not be permitted to use offensively an anticompetition clause
coupled with a forfeiture provision to economically cripple a former employee
and simultaneously deny other potential employers his services.113

Putting aside the forfeiture aspect, mutuality, if it has a current meaning
in contract law, is simply another name for consideration. To the extent
the concept requires at least roughly equal commitments on both sides of
the transaction, which is how the Post court viewed the concept, it has long
been rejected in other areas of contract law.114 It is a fairness doctrine,

111. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y.
1979).
112. See J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313, 1322
(N.Y. 1977) (excusing a condition of timely notice for renewal of a lease when tenant would
forfeit substantial investment in its business). Thus, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of
a condition to a promise—in this case, not competing as a condition of pension benefits—
where “disproportionate forfeiture” would occur (the loss of pension benefits), unless the
condition was a “material part” of the exchange. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 229
(AM . L. INST. 1981). Obviously, there is room for debate about the materiality of the
noncompetition clause even if there is otherwise a disproportionate forfeiture.
113. Post, 397 N.E.2d at 360–61; see Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive
Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L. J. 37, 89 n.257 (1995); see also Orion Broad., Inc. v. Forsythe,
477 F. Supp. 198, 200–01 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (holding the covenant to lack mutuality).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 79(c) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“If the requirement
of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . (c) ‘mutuality of obligation.’”;
see Matthew W. Finkin, Lea VanderVelde, William Corbett & Stephen F. Befort, Working
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts:
Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 117 (2009) (“Mutuality of contract was a
principle that provided there was no consideration to support a contract if the economic
value given in exchange was much less than that of the promise or the promised performance;
this ‘mutuality of obligation’ was said to be essential to a contract. The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts abandoned that notion.”).
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and, as one distinguished commentator noted, part of the traditional dogma
of contract law is that “[t]here is simply no room for any inquiry into the
fairness of the exchange.”115 While there are exceptions to that generalization,
most notably unconscionability,116 courts that have refused to enforce an
NCA have almost never looked explicitly to that doctrine.117
However, most noncompetes are litigated in suits seeking injunctive
relief, which entails the application of equitable doctrines as to whether
the relief should be granted.118 Thus, another fairness constraint pops up
in the cases speaking in terms of refusing to grant equitable relief, which
may explain the use of “inequitable” in the Restatement blackletter. Putting
aside the possible suggestion that those courts might reach a different result
were the action one for damages,119 the question remains what exactly
makes specific enforcement inequitable.
Presumably the answer lies in equity maxims like “unclean hands” or
“he who seeks equity must do equity.”120 That in turn requires that the plaintiff
do something that is in some sense wrongful. 121 However, the courts
looking to equity to refuse to enforce an NCA in this circumstance do not
make clear why it is wrongful for an employer to assert its rights under
115. P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L. J. 1, 1 (1985).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also U.C.C.
§§ 2-302, 2A-108 (AM. L. INST. 2020).
117. One of the few cases is Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994), which recognized the possibility of an unconscionable agreement
but seemed to tie it to refusal of a court sitting in equity to deny enforcement.
118. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 9.04(b), cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2015).
119. Although often described as limited to equity, many applications of similar
reasoning apply at law. See generally, T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An
Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. 63, 74–75 (2010–11); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Coming into Equity with Clean Hands: I, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877, 885 (1949); Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands: II, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 1074 (1949).
120. See T. Leigh Anenson, Announcing the “Clean Hands” Doctrine, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1827, 1853 n.147 (2017). The notion is so amorphous that it is hard to call
it a doctrine, but it seems to entail at least two concerns: preventing plaintiffs from
profiting from their own wrongs and avoiding making the court complicit in those wrongs.
Id. at 1840–41 (“The purposes of equity, and its defenses in particular, were to stop
strategic behavior and safeguard the court. In this vein, the maxim of ‘he [or she] who
comes into equity must come with clean hands’ developed to ‘protect the court against the
odium that would follow its interference to enable a party to profit by his own wrongdoing.’ It follows that the defense serves two fundamental purposes. It protects judicial
integrity and promotes justice.”).
121. The wrong must also be somehow connected to the claim that triggered the
lawsuit. Anenson, supra note 120, at 1867 (“United States Supreme Court decisions of
unclean hands continue to require a relationship between the wrong and the remedy or
right. . . . But the unclean conduct need not be in the same transaction so long as the events
are related. Akin to fraud jurisprudence, it is sufficient if the dirty deed infects the issue
before the court.”) (citations omitted)). But that would not seem a separate problem in this
context since the “wrong” is presumably the termination.
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the contract both to terminate without cause and to be protected from
competition thereafter. By hypothesis, the restraint is otherwise reasonable,
and the employer is simply asserting its dual contractual rights to discharge
at will and to be protected by a reasonable NCA. It may be a hard bargain,
but that is traditionally not enough for equity to deny enforcement.122
Maybe the unclean hands justification could be predicated on the notion
that the harm to the employee is disproportionate to the benefit to the
employer. This might explain cases that describe the discharge as indicating
that the employer finds the employee “worthless”123 or labeling the result
a kind of “peonage.”124 Such an approach would permit courts to weigh the
competing interests but would not seem to support the Restatement’s
apparent flat rule of nonenforcement.
Another possible justification—that noncompetes have adverse third
party effects—seems wrong, at least in the sense that those effects are
supposedly weighed in the process of deciding whether a restraint is reasonable
to begin with: a “public interest” override on an otherwise reasonable
restraint is recognized in Restatement § 8.06(i).125 It is true that few NCAs
are struck down on this ground, but it is also true that the public harm in
terms of the loss of competition is no more or less whether a discharge is
for convenience or for cause.
Still another justification would look to hardship to the employee, and
the traditional multipart test for a reasonable restraint required a finding
that it did not impose an undue burden or hardship on the employee.126 A
122. See Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 414
(1919) (“[T]aking the allegations of the bill to be true, it undoubtedly is, a case of a hard
bargain. But equity does not relieve from hard bargains simply because they are such.”);
Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 597 S.E.2d 34, 38 (Va. 2004) (“A court of equity
will not set aside a contract because it is ‘rash, improvident or [a] hard bargain’ but equity
will act if the circumstances raise the inference that the contract was the result of imposition,
deception, or undue influence.” (quoting Payne v. Simmons, 350 S.E.2d 637, 640 (Va. 1986))).
123. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
124. Orion Broad., Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198, 201 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
125. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2006).
126. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 188 states:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary
to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of
trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s
legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and
the likely injury to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (emphasis added).
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non-cause discharge imposes a great hardship on the employee who loses
both his current paycheck and the prospect of substitute employment—at
least within the restricted area.127 However, the Restatement of Employment
Law correctly states that “undue burden” is almost never the basis for
modern courts refusing to enforce an otherwise-reasonable covenant.128
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions still pay lip service to the principle that
a valid covenant cannot impose an undue hardship on the former employee,129
so there is at least an extant rubric under which to slot concern for the
employee terminated without cause.
The problem, of course, is that the fix the employee is in is the same
whether she voluntarily quit, was terminated for cause, or was terminated
for the employer’s convenience. If hardship plays a bigger role here, it is
not because of the employee’s situation, but because the employer exercised
its contractual rights to her disadvantage. This is not to say that there is
no difference among the possible reasons for job loss, only that “hardship”
does not capture that difference.
Some courts have suggested that enforcement in such cases may violate
the duty of good faith and fair dealing,130 which is implied in every contract131
and sometimes offers a remedy for employer opportunism.132 For example,
one opinion suggested that a discharge in such a situation might indicate
that the employer was simply seeking to insulate itself from competition,
not to protect its legitimate interests.133 Noting that the governing contract
was terminable at will, it saw the situation as
present[ing] the potential for an unreasonable restraint of trade. For example, if
an employer hired an employee at will, obtained a covenant not to compete, and

127. Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 215 A.2d 222, 225–26 (Md. 1965) (holding that
restrictive covenant imposed “undue hardship” on the employee in part because employee
was fired “through no fault of his own”).
128. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“Courts often claim
to evaluate whether a restrictive covenant creates an undue burden on the employee who
agreed to it. However, courts seldom, if ever, invalidate covenants solely on this
ground . . . . At most, it seems that the undue-burden requirement is a tack-on rationale
courts use only when a restrictive covenant is otherwise invalid.”).
129. A number of jurisdictions have some variation of section 188 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See supra note 127; Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc., 565 A.2d
615, 618 (D.C. 1989).
130. E.g., Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., PC, 644 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (“[T]he implied promise of good faith inherent in every contract precludes the
enforcement of a noncompetition clause when the employee is dismissed without cause.”).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
132. See Bailey v. King, 398 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ark. 1966) (“[I]f an employer
obtained an agreement of this nature from an employee, and then, without reasonable
cause, fired him, the agreement would not be binding. In other words, an employer cannot
use this type of contract as a subterfuge to rid himself of a possible future competitor.”).
133. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993).

702

58-3_SULLIVAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 677, 2021]

10/7/2021 4:09 PM

Noncompetes in a Downsizing World
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

then terminated the employee, without cause, to arbitrarily restrict competition,
we believe such conduct would constitute bad faith. Simple justice requires that
a termination by the employer of an at will employee be in good faith if a covenant
not to compete is to be enforced.134

However, the court found no bad faith in the case before it,135 and that
would seem to be true in almost any situation where the employment
continued for a meaningful length of time before the termination. In other
words, the argument makes sense when the NCA is signed on Monday and
the employee laid off on Tuesday,136 but it has less obvious application
when the no-cause termination occurs months or years later. A motive to
enter into the contract merely to take the employee off the competitive
boards seems vanishing unlikely in such situations.137
But two scholars have advanced important variations on the theme, ones
that do not require finding an employer plot at the outset. Rather, they argue
that in such situations the employer is violating an implicit bargain—the
employee gets her job in return for satisfactory work so long as she
chooses to continue her employment.138 The earliest law review article to
briefly notice these cases was written by Professor Joseph M. Perillo who
fitted them within a paradigm he described as “abuse of rights”:
The shared purpose of an employment agreement containing a covenant not to
compete is to protect the employer from conduct that is in the penumbra of unfair
competition while assuring the employee a means of practicing the trade or
profession for which the employee is trained. The employee’s purpose in agreeing to
the covenant is to practice this trade or profession with the employer who has
now destroyed the assurance of a job while seeking to prevent the employee from
working at such a job elsewhere. Such enforcement would be a grave abuse of
rights.139

134. Id.
135. See id. at 548.
136. See supra note 87.
137. This ignores the possible strategic uses of NCAs to tie up potential competitors
as a hedge against the failure to achieve more ambitious goals.
138. See, e.g., Perillo, supra note 87 at 89.
139. Id. See also 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY § 80.15 (2003) (while “[c]lassical contract law would suggest that the lack of cause
for the termination should be irrelevant to the enforceability of restrictive covenants[,]
many courts do not enforce covenants if the termination is without cause” (citation omitted)).
That discussion draws heavily on Perillo.
The classic article on such restraints mentions the circumstances of termination only in
a brief paragraph that focuses mostly on withholding of equitable relief. Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 685 (1960).
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Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman takes a similar tack:
[T]he judicial trend toward disallowing enforcement in the involuntary termination
context is consistent with the parties’ understanding of their implicit agreement
and the limits of the employer’s interest in its workers. The act of terminating
the employee [without cause] belies the existence of any continued interest in the
employee’s skills, commitment, or services that could justify a restraint, regardless of
the employer’s expectations at the outset of the relationship. Indeed, in situations
in which the employee is terminated the implicit agreement of the new workplace
specifically contemplates that the employee will be able to resell his human
capital to competitors.140

In short, this rationale depends on a tacit understanding that the employee
will be allowed to continue to earn her living in her chosen field—by working
either for the current employer or for a competitor.
I have no doubt that both scholars are correct in terms of how employees
would describe their expectations if asked, but subjective expectations
have had little effect on the law’s treatment of contractual commitments,
hence the dominance of the at-will rule to begin with.141 In any event, the
problem with this approach is the doctrinal qualification that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not override express terms of
a contract.142 An employment agreement that both permits termination at

140. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes,
80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1217 n.186 (2001) (citation omitted). But see Andrew J. Gallo, Comment,
A Uniform Rule for Enforcement of Non-Competition Contracts Considered in Relation to
“Termination” Cases, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 719, 719 (1997–98) (arguing against any
special rule for termination cases).
141. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133–36
(1997) (finding that a majority of employee respondents erroneously believed that the law
protected them from certain types of arbitrary discharge).
142. See Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 842 N.W.2d 240, 251 (Wis. 2013) (“A
party may not, however, employ the good faith and fair dealing covenant to undo express
terms of an agreement.”). That is the basis for the almost unanimous holdings of courts
that the implied duty cannot override the employer’s right to terminate in the at-will context.
See Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000) (“Precisely because employment
at will allows the employer freedom to terminate the relationship as it chooses, the employer
does not frustrate the employee’s contractual rights merely by doing so.”).
The Restatement of Employment Law recognizes the implied covenant but largely limits
it to dealing with opportunistic conduct not explicitly authorized by the contract, “which
includes a party’s obligation not to hinder the other party’s performance under, or deprive
the other of the benefit of,” the contract. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 2.07(a) (AM. L. INST.
2015). That duty must be read “in a manner consistent with the essential nature of an atwill relationship.” Id. § 2.07(b). The Restatement conforms with case law establishing
that the implied covenant “includes the duty not to terminate . . . the employment relationship
for the purpose of . . . preventing the vesting or accrual of an employee right or benefit . . . .”
Id. § 2.07(c)(1); see generally Lea VanderVelde, Where Is the Concept of Good Faith in
the Restatement of Employment?, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 335 (2017).
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will and contains a noncompetition clause arguably does precisely that.
And it certainly does so when the clause in question expressly reaches
involuntary not-for-cause discharges.143
V. A FRESH LOOK
The starting point for any discussion of the principles governing
noncompetition agreements is the recognition that, contrary to contract
law’s general preference for private ordering, NCAs are subject to significant
legal constraints. The Restatement accurately reflects the common law’s
departure from normal freedom of contract analysis both by limiting the
employer’s interests to those deemed “legitimate” and by requiring tailoring
of the restraint to those interests.144 Although different jurisdictions adopt
variations on the theme,145 there is universal recognition that employers
and employees are not given free rein in postemployment restraints.146
The current justification for such an approach is the third-party effects
of NCAs. That is, the law intervenes to ensure that the public is protected
by preserving competitive markets: cases are legion reciting that employers
have no legitimate interest in suppressing competition as such.147 Oddly,
143. There might be room for a court to find ambiguity in some NCAs. Thus, a
contract that provided only for operation of the noncompete after termination might be read as
unclear as to what kind of termination. For example, an actual NCA used by a financial
services firm provides:
I agree that during the course of my employment and for a period of 6 months
immediately following the termination of my relationship with the Company,
whether I resign voluntarily or am terminated by the Company involuntarily . . .
On file with the author. Involuntarily might be read to mean “for cause,” or at least be
ambiguous as to that possibility. On the other hand, a similar agreement of another financial
services firm provides:
[You] agree that while you are employed with [firm], and for the length of time
set forth in each subparagraph below following the termination of your employment
for any reason whatsoever . . . .
On file with the author (emphasis added). It is hard to see much room for the implied
covenant to operate in this NCA.
144. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.07 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
145. Stuart S. Menela, Post-Employment Agreements Not to Compete (US), ASSOC.
OF CORP. COUNS. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.acc.com/resource-library/post-employmentagreements-not-compete-us# [https://perma.cc/33K9-LUL6].
146. See generally id.
147. E.g., Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“[I]t is well settled that
only a legitimate business interest may be protected by a noncompetition covenant. If the
sole purpose is to avoid ordinary competition, it is unreasonable and unenforceable.”). See
also R ESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.07 cmt. f (AM . L. I NST. 2015) (“[A]n employer’s
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however, avoidance of adverse third party effects, although it underlies
the law’s entire approach to noncompetition agreements, appears in formal
doctrine only as one factor in the reasonableness analysis.148 Further, it
rarely has independent significance if the other requirements are met.149
Indeed, the Restatement downplays this factor even more by providing for
nonenforcement only where there is “a great public need for the special
skills and services of the former employee [that] outweighs any legitimate
interest of the employer in enforcing the covenant.”150 In other words, for
the Restatement, the public’s interest in competition is essentially baked
into deciding whether the restraint is reasonably tailored, with public need
for services being a rare exception to the law’s approval of an appropriately
circumscribed restraint. Although common law courts do not typically frame
the exception so narrowly, they rarely invalidate an otherwise reasonable
restraint on this ground, and, even then, almost always in the context of
medical services.151
And, while we need not revisit what courts should do when the restraint
as written is excessive,152 the many cases where the courts strike down an

understandable wish to prevent competition by former employees is not, by itself, a
protectable interest under this Section.”).
148. E.g., Star Direct Inc. v. Dal Pra, 767 N.W.2d 898, 905 (Wis. 2009) (“A
restrictive covenant must: (1) be necessary for the protection of the employer, that is, the
employer must have a protectable interest justifying the restriction imposed on the activity
of the employee; (2) provide a reasonable time limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial
limit; (4) not be harsh or oppressive as to the employee; and (5) not be contrary to public
policy.” (citing Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 98 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. 1959)); Boice-Willis
Clinic, P.A. v. Seaman, No. COA05-298, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2688, at *6 (Ct. App. Dec.
20, 2005) (covenant cannot be “so broad as to be oppressive to the covenantor or the public,”
which may require an inquiry as to “a substantial question of potential harm to the public
health.”); Weber, 913 P.2d at 89 (“A noncompetition covenant ancillary to an employment
contract is valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances and
not adverse to the public welfare.”).
149. Lawrence Peikes & Michael J. Kasdan, Limitations and Best Practices for
Using Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Company Trade Secrets, NAT’L L. REV.
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/limitations-and-best-practices-usingnon-competition-agreements-to-protect-company [https://perma.cc/8EVZ-8LS6].
150. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.06(d) (AM. L. INST. 2015) (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., Aesthetic Facial & Ocular Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Zaldivar, 826
S.E.2d 723, 730 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (invalidating as against public policy a covenant
restricting surgeon’s “ability to practice in the most populated areas of North Carolina
when there are very few oculofacial plastic surgeons, and even fewer who perform some
of the specialized procedures he is trained to provide”); Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More,
869 A.2d 884, 899 (N.J. 2005) (“The evidence was overwhelming that prohibiting Dr.
More from attending to neurological patients in Somerset’s emergency room would be
injurious to the public interest.”).
152. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable
Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (2009). See, e.g., Team Env’t Servs. v. Addison,
2 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that modifying unreasonably broad covenants
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NCA entirely or at least narrow its length, space, or sweep in order to
render the restraint reasonable153 testify to the tendency of employers to
overreach in efforts to foreclose competition and the corresponding willingness
of courts to rein in those efforts.
This judicial reaction can be explained as an effort to minimize third
party effects, but the overall doctrinal structure not only furthers the public
interest in competition but also necessarily protects employees from employers
overreaching. Might this in turn suggest a possible second purpose to the
law of postemployment restraints: protecting the weaker party in such
transactions? There are hints of such a view scattered in the Restatement.
For example, § 8.06 comment a notes a negative aspect of restrictive
covenants as their “inhibit[ing] the freedom of employees to leave their
employers and move to other employment where the employees may be
more productive” as a separate concern from the public interest in
competition. 154 And comment f to § 8.07, while recognizing that an
employer “may have many economic reasons to attempt to restrict what
its employees can do after termination of their employment,” concludes
that only the approved ones are “sufficiently weighty to justify the social
and individual costs inherent in restrictions on competition.”155
Admittedly, there is more than a little tension between any concern for
employees separate and apart from third party harms and the Restatement’s
explicit rejection of protection of employees from undue hardship. But
arguably the Restatement’s stance can be reconciled: it rejects hardship as
a constraint on reasonable restraints only when the employee is free to earn a
living but chooses to resign or gives cause to be discharged. Hardship enters
the picture when that basic assumption disappears.
incentivizes overbreadth); Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc.,
968 F.2d 1463, 1469 (1st Cir. 1992) (detailing various judicial approaches to the question
of overbroad clauses). The Employment Restatement permits judicial modification unless
barred by the agreement or “the employer lacked a reasonable and good-faith basis for
believing the covenant was enforceable.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.08 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
It continues: “Lack of a reasonable and good-faith basis for believing a covenant was
enforceable may be manifested by its gross overbreadth alone, or by overbreadth coupled
with other evidence that the employer sought to do more than protect its legitimate interests.”
Id.
153. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 8.08 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2015).
154. Id. § 8.06 cmt. a.
155. Id. § 8.07 cmt. f (emphasis added). It goes on to say that recouping training
costs might support an obligation to repay but not a noncompetition clause . Id. See
generally Jonathan F. Harris, Unconscionability in Contracting for Worker Training, 72
ALA. L. REV. 724 (2021).
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This reconciliation may be too-clever-by-half as an explanation of the
actual Restatement. But, Restatement aside, it does suggest an alternative
basis for intervention in some circumstances: protection of the right of the
individual to practice a chosen trade or profession. NCAs, of course, necessarily
limit that right to a considerable extent, but they do not negate it so long
as the employee may continue working for her employer. And, to the extent
that the employee resigns voluntarily or loses her position for performancerelated cause, she can be said to have elected the resultant sidelining.
The right may have constitutional roots in terms of the Thirteenth
Amendment and “free labor” scholarship,156 but the common law need not
look to such sources to recognize that agreements that wholly preclude an
individual from practicing her trade or profession, even for a limited time,
raise serious fairness concerns. These concerns are reflected, if not articulated
clearly, in the various decisions we have surveyed holding or suggesting
that an employer who fires a worker without cause cannot enforce a
noncompete. So long as the worker remains employed, she can continue
to work and forfeits that right only by resigning or giving her employer
good cause to discharge her. In contrast, enforcing a noncompete against
a worker who is terminated without good cause deprives her of the right
to work in her chosen trade or profession for the duration of the restraint.
Indeed, to the extent that legal restraints on NCAs are effective, they
necessarily benefit both the public and the employee. Instead of viewing
this as a kind of artifact of limiting noncompetes to those reasonably
furthering legitimate aims in terms of the public interest, it might be viewed
as a second justification. Under that approach, § 8.06’s invalidation of
otherwise-reasonable restraints when they are inequitable merely extends
the general principle rather than creating an exception to it. The cases
approving such a rule can be viewed not as incoherent but as inarticulate.
Nor does contract law’s normal disdain for fairness overrides matter since
we are in an area in which fairness is a legitimate part of the judicial
inquiry and judicial intuitions can be expressed more directly.
In short, enforcement is denied because the benefit to the employer is
likely to be disproportionate to the harm to the employee; the employer
156. See Ayesha Bell Hardaway, The Paradox of the Right to Contract: Noncompete
Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 957, 978 (2016)
(arguing that for low-wage workers, NCAs violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Lea S.
VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437,
439 (1989). But see Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1733, 1737 (2012) (expressing doubts about the likelihood of judicial acceptance of expansive
readings of the Thirteenth Amendment); Pamela Brandwein, The “Labor Vision” of the
Thirteenth Amendment, Revisited, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 14 (2017) (challenging
the historical claim that the Thirteenth Amendment was “a charter for labor freedom and
class leveling”).
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could have avoided any harm by retaining the employee; whatever the
contract says, the reasonable employee would not anticipate a no-cause
discharge depriving her of her livelihood entirely for the duration of the
restraint; and the court, especially one sitting in equity, should not be complicit
in such unfairness. In other words, looking to the cases, all of the above.
There are at least two responses to this. One simply challenges the
fairness claim. It is true that NCAs restrict individual freedom, but, given
the legal constraints circumscribing their use, the harm is arguably
minimal and always temporary. Rarely will a valid NCA actually prevent
an employee from practicing her trade, and then for only a limited period.
More likely, a valid NCA will only prevent (and often only limit) her from
doing so in a fairly narrow geographic area. Given the multifaceted ways
in which employees are free to agree on limitations of their conduct, an
otherwise-reasonable NCA is arguably small potatoes.
Second is the question why the law should put a fairness thumb on the
scale for employees rather than leave the issue to the market. If the Route
128 debate is resolved in favor of the California model, the issue disappears,
but if supporters of the efficiency-enhancing effects of noncompetes win
the day, fairness concerns arguably have no place.
Even then, however, more nuanced treatment of NCAs might be appropriate.
It has long been recognized that one effect of postemployment restraints
is to impede employee mobility, that is, they put a kind of tax on employee’s
leaving for greener pastures,157 and some even argue that that is a major,
if rarely acknowledged, purpose of such clauses.158 Such a tax undercuts
the threat of the employee’s departing and thus her bargaining position
with her current employer and therefore should result in lower compensation
than would obtain absent the restraint. Defenders of the current rule suggest
that, at least in competitive markers, compensation will be set higher to
begin with to offset that disadvantage.159 In other words, they argue that
the compensation affects may be more or less a wash.
Whatever economists might say, employers apparently think that they
save labor costs by deploying noncompetes. That can be seen, absent recent
legislative prohibitions,160 in their increasing use in the low end of the
157. Blake, supra note 139, at 648 (courts recognize that “an employee covenant has
an inevitable tendency to reduce an employee’s mobility and bargaining power during his
employment.”).
158. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 12, at 1034.
159. Id. at 1037.
160. Id. at 1032.
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labor market where no plausible competitive harm exists.161 It also is
reflected in the use of nonpoaching agreements where state law forecloses
enforceable NCAs. Given the risks of antitrust liability, such employers
must anticipate a payoff.162
The limited empirical work thus far suggests some truth to both positions;
one study finds a meaningful positive association with higher wages for
workers who are presented with noncompetes as part of the job offer but
a large negative effect for those who are required to sign NCAs after
employment commences.163 It might be that fairness concerns, therefore,
play out in greater regulation rather than a flat-out ban on noncompetes.
Indeed, some of the current reforms seek to ensure informed consent by
employees,164 or “additional compensation” for NCAs executed mid-term.165

161. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 672–73 (reporting class actions challenging franchise nohire agreements by “many fast food franchises including Carl Karcher Enterprises (Carl’s
Jr.), McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, Jimmy John’s, Arby’s, Cinnabon, Little Caesars, Burger King,
and Dunkin Donuts”).
162. Litigation involving no-poaching agreements by some of the biggest technology
firms in Silicon Valley ended with a Department of Justice consent decree with the defendants
and the settlement of a class action subsequently brought on behalf of the engineers whose
compensation was allegedly suppressed by the agreement. See Lobel, supra note 2, at
668–69; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016).
163. Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 41, at 12 (finding that those “who learn of
their noncompete before accepting their job” have higher earnings and greater job satisfaction
than employees without noncompetes). “In contrast, those presented with a noncompete
after accepting their job offer (excluding those furnished with a noncompete following a
promotion or a change in responsibilities) appear to receive no observable boost in wages
or training, are 13.4 percentage points less likely to have had information shared with them
(a 24% reduction), and are 8.5 percentage points less likely to be satisfied in their jobs (a
12.5% reduction)”). Id.; see also Natarajan Balasubramanian et al., Locked In? The
Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers 8
(Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1339, 2017) (“Compared with their peers in lowenforceability states, we find no evidence that the reduced mobility of tech workers
in high-enforceability states is offset by higher wage levels. In contrast, consistent with
reduced bargaining power in high CNC regimes . . . we find that tech workers, conditional
on their initial wage, earn lower wages (between –0.5% and –0.7% for a one-standarddeviation increase in CNC enforceability) throughout their job spell in higher enforceability
states. Our results show that at every phase of job tenure, conditional on their initial wage
at a firm, tech workers in high-enforceability states earn less than their counterparts in
lower enforceability states. In fact, we find that starting a job in a high-enforceability state
results in persistently lower wages over the next eight years of the worker’s career.
Together, our results strongly suggest that CNC enforceability is associated with a
‘job lock.’” (citations omitted)).
164. See supra note 27.
165. See supra note 27.

710

58-3_SULLIVAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 677, 2021]

10/7/2021 4:09 PM

Noncompetes in a Downsizing World
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

VI. A NO-PROBLEM PROBLEM?
Having spilled a fair amount of ink on the question of enforcement
against laid-off workers, it is fair to ask whether this might not be a noproblem problem. That is, one possibility for the relative paucity of case
law on the question is simply that employers rarely seek to enforce NCAs
when they terminate their workers without cause. While there is a steady
trickle of decisions raising the issue,166 it is scarcely a stream. Of course,
that may be in part a function of the relatively constrained use of noncompetes
in past decades and provides no guarantee that the more common deployment
of them in the modern workplace will not generate more efforts. Further,
enforcement is more likely as competition becomes more severe and it is
possible that a post-COVID world will see even more aggressive efforts
to curb threats perceived to be posed by former employees.
But it is also true that, as I have argued at length elsewhere,167 that the
mere existence of an NCA may discourage former employees—and their
potential new employers—from entering into competitive businesses.168
Adoption by a few key courts of the Restatement rule would, at least for
well-advised employees, alleviate this problem somewhat. Alternatively,
adding such a principle to various legislative reforms should be considered.
But, ultimately, the elimination of the in terrorem effects of unenforceable
NCAs will require some sanction beyond merely voiding the provision.
Absent that, “how can it hurt?” is likely to be the default principle for
employers and their attorneys.
VII. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Employers are not likely to remain quiescent should the Restatement’s
view gain traction and result in NCAs being enforceable only when the
employee voluntarily resigns or is fired for material breach. While such a
rule may well cause employers to rethink some prospective terminations,

166. Sullivan, supra note 152, at 1129 n.9, 130 n.12 (explaining that employers may
have employees sign unenforceable NCAs, counting on the in terrorem value of the contract
regardless of enforceability).
167. Id. at 1129. Recent research has confirmed the widespread use of NCAs even
in states where they are clearly unenforceable. J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan
P. Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project,
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 461 (2016).
168. Sullivan, supra note 152, at 1129.
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the more common reaction is likely to be resistance to its application and
efforts to exploit its weaknesses.
One is the notion of constructive discharge, which § 8.06 clearly intends
to apply in this context.169 In other settings, it means something like the
employer having “created an intolerable situation in which a reasonable
employee would feel compelled to quit.”170 But the context in which the
concept arises is generally employer action in retaliation for exercising
protected rights, whether under the public policy tort171 or other statutes.172
It is not clear whether an employer who substantially changes an employee’s
working conditions, which is normally within its rights for at-will employees,
will have constructively discharged a worker for purposes of § 8.06(a).
Perhaps the drafters had in mind actions intended to lead to a resignation,173
not the kind of changes that might result from changing economic and
business conditions, but that needs to be resolved and resolution of this
question may be critical to the success of the Restatement formulation.
In addition to resisting the adoption of the rule in the courts, employers
are likely to alter their practices and their contracts. Practice-wise, one
would anticipate an increase in discharges labelled as performance-based
when preserving a noncompete is important. Whether the action is justified
or the so-called cause manufactured, the effect is likely to be fewer “layoffs”
and more performance-related discharges with associated economic—possible
loss of unemployment insurance and severance compensation—emotional,
and reputational harm.
As for contracts, since cause is defined by the Restatement to mean material
breach by the employee or something quite like it,174 employer-side attorneys
are likely to draft contracts that are more specific in terms of duties and
conduct to assure that, should it be necessary, a termination can be labelled
for cause.
Otherwise, employers would find themselves in ambiguous situations.
For example, in Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic,175 the court found that
the termination of an at-will employee did not invalidate the noncompetition
169. See supra note 59.
170. RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 5.01 cmt. c, illus. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 129–30 (2004) (discussing
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
173. Under Title VII, some courts required both intolerable working conditions and
proof that such conditions were imposed in order to force plaintiff to leave in order to find
a constructive discharge. E.g., Gosbin v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’rs, 725 F. App’x 377 (6th
Cir. 2018) (citing cases). If this theory were ever tenable, it has likely been laid to rest by
Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016), for Title VII but might be revived in determining
whether an NCA should be enforced against a resigning employee.
174. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. L. § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
175. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc. v. Hopper, 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993).
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clause because it was in good faith. But the result might well be different
under the Restatement rule. Dr. Hopper was fired for exploring the purchase
of a competing practice, 176 which may or may not have constituted an
anticipatory repudiation 177 and therefore a material breach; thus, absent
language explicitly prohibiting such conduct, the Restatement rule
might very well bar enforcement.
Indeed, there is a potential moral hazard problem here: an employee
wishing to leave might slack off in her performance in order to trigger a
discharge. How likely it is that employees might produce subpar results
without being in material breach is another question, but, should this rule
be widely accepted, employers may start drafting even at-will contracts
with requirements that would constitute material breach should the employee
not comply.178 While the employer will not need cause to discharge, it
will need cause to enforce any NCA, and it is likely that the courts will defer
to the employer’s specification of what constitutes acceptable performance.
One downside is that there is likely to emerge a third variety of “for cause”
provisions rather than the Restatement’s current two.179
Whether these risks are sufficient reasons to reject the Restatement’s rule
is another question entirely.

176. Id. at 542 (“Trial testimony presented evidence of increasing tension prior to
termination in the professional relationship between Dr. Johnson and Dr. Hopper. This
tension, however, did not appear to result in the termination. The notice of termination
was given after Dr. Hopper was confronted about her negotiations to purchase a competitive
practice and after Dr. Hopper had termed the employment contract worthless.”).
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 250 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(requiring action to be “definite” and “unequivocal” to constitute a repudiation). In any
event, defendant’s conduct almost certainly gave the employer “reasonable grounds for
insecurity” that would have enabled it to demand adequate assurances of performance, and
the failure of the employee to provide such an assurance would constitute an anticipatory
repudiation). Id. § 251.
178. This possibility has already been raised in Massachusetts which, as we have
seen, by statute bars NCA enforcement for those discharged without cause. See Feblowitz,
supra note 27, at 2286 (“An otherwise valid noncompete is unenforceable against an employee
who is terminated without cause, so employers may seek to expand the definition of cause
in their employment contracts. It remains to be seen whether the contracting parties or the
courts will be responsible for determining what does and does not constitute cause for
termination.”).
179. See supra note 55.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Whatever the general reception of the Restatement of Employment Law,
its drafters deserve credit for having surfaced an important but littlenoticed aspect of the enforcement of noncompetition agreements. They
also deserve credit for formulating a rule that puts fairness to employees
front-and-center by rejecting enforceability when an employee is terminated
without performance-related cause. Although the issue has been relatively
rarely litigated in the past, wholesale COVID-related layoffs may propel
it to new prominence, and the American Law Institute has come out on the
right side.
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